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Abstract
If we are ever to have intelligent systems, they will need memory. Memory is the core
of learning; intelligence is about entering, extracting, and synthesizing its contents.
What makes the memory problem difficult is that memory is not a simple collection
of facts. The how and why of where those facts were acquired is a key part of how
they are internalized and used later.
As a step towards solving this large and difficult problem, I have focused on how
people learn to trust each other when they have a conversation. The model I have
created represents people as sets of self-organizing maps; each has a map to represent
his own beliefs, and a map to represent what he thinks of another person. Beliefs are
in this model restricted to likes and dislikes, across a wide range of topics. In this
thesis I describe the program implemented in Java to test this model. The model has
been tested on four different kinds of conversations, with the topics of animals and
cars, to determine whether its behavior looks reasonable to a human observer.
In this work I show how a simple, natural model can closely approximate human
behavior, without need for tweaking parameters.
Thesis Supervisor: Patrick H. Winston
Title: Ford Professor of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If we are to ever be able to build an intelligent system, that system must be able to
learn from its experiences. True learning does not happen when new facts are dryly
entered into a memory bank; learning happens through experience. Every time a
new fact is acquired, there is some context in which it is learned: the location, the
person speaking, the emotional state of the learner. The problem of context is vast:
humans have at least five different kinds of perception, each of which has its own
particular quirks of understanding. Furthermore, there are contexts which we might
call "emotional"-a beloved teacher might make a student love math, while a hated
teacher might lead the student to despise equations forever.
One of the important questions in any context is whether or not trust exists. It
is hard for humans to learn if they don't trust their environment and their teachers.
Thus an important question is, how do we learn to trust? Trusting in parents is
a genetic predisposition for young children, and for many any person in a position
of authority is automatically trusted. This leads to other questions about human
behavior. Why does propaganda work? Why should an advertisement on television
or in a newspaper ever cause someone to vote Republican or buy a soda? Why do
people sometimes believe the lies of friends who have lied to them many times before.
Why do so many people believe politicians, even when the facts are contradictory?
Why do others refuse to believe them no matter how much evidence there is?
In order to have a reasonable problem to attack, I choose one very specific kind
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of experience and build a system that can understand interactions involving that
experience within a larger context. Conversation provides that experience. If we
consider only the words spoken, without considering visual cues or tone of voice,
a tractable problem reveals itself. Whenever we have a conversation with another
human being, what we take away from that conversation is not just the sum of the
statements spoken. If some stranger approached you and claimed to have seen an
elephant flying towards a tree, you would probably dismiss him as mildly insane, and
the statement as being produced by a deranged mind and invalid. Why should such
a statement be dismissed?
There are a number of reasons. First, a stranger has no credibility: you two have
no history, so you trust him only as much as any other stranger, and your perception of
him will change quickly based on the first few things he says. If instead a close friend
told you that lie had see an elephant in flight, you might discount the statement, but
you probably don't instantly assume the friend is deranged. You might lose a little
bit of confidence in himin, but the reaction isn't as strong.
Why do you dismiss the statement no matter who says it? Because all your
experience leads you to believe that elephants simply do not fly, no matter what the
circumstance. Most people continue to believe what they already believe, even in the
face of evidence to the contrary. Perhaps if everyone you know began talking of flying
elephants, you might start to believe in them.
I have a built a system that begins to model these complex interactions within
the mind.
12
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 K-lines
In a 1979 A.I. memo called K-lines: A Theory of Memory, and later with his 1985
book Society of Mind, Marvin Minsky proposes a theory of memory that in many
ways satisfies my criteria. Minksy suggests that there are many agents in our minds
that may or may not get activated when an event occurs. When a set of agents
is triggered, a K-line connecting them is formed, which binds them together as a
memory. With this theory, all memory is formed of experience, and memories are
referenced when a state close to the same K-line structure is reached. While this
theory satisfies the need to have memories in context, it goes too far; K-lines make
it unclear how something could just be remembered as a fact and not an experience.
Furthermore, no implementation details have been given, and in twenty-five years no
one has claimed to have implemented it.
2.2 Threads
Also in 1979 Lucia Vaina and Richard Greenblatt proposed the use of thread memory:
a kind of memory in which words are stored as threads that contain the word's
superclasses. In essence, each word exists as a linear descendant of other words. For
example BANANA might be BANANA -- THING -> LIVING-THING - FRUIT ->
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BANANA. Any word might have multiple threads associated with it, to represent its
various characteristics. Threads allow a form of distance metric between words. Any
two words are connected by tracing up the thread of one to a fork point, and down
the thread of another. This memory structure is used to underpin the key model in
this thesis.
2.3 Self-Organizing Maps
In order to organize my conversation memory, I employ Teuvo Kohonen's self-organizing
map (SOM). The self-organizing map has a number of properties that make it ideal
for this application. A SOM is a tool for bringing out the inherent regularity of a
set of objects. The traditional demonstration is with colors: when a SOM is trained
with colors, clusters of similar colors emerge, sometimes in the form of a rainbow,
depending upon implementation. There is no need to specify the number of clusters,
only two things are needed-a distance metric for the objects to be trained, and some
way of making one object "more similar" to another object.
The basic algorithm assumes some starting grid of nodes of size n x n, and some
training set:
" Given a an input x, find the cell in the map ci such that the distance between
x and the contents of ci is minimized for all i, 1 i < n2. "Distance" may be
subjectively defined, but often simple Euclidean distance is sufficient.
" Find the set of neighboring cells of C that are within some radius r of ci.
" For each member of Ci, including the winning cell ci, make that cell "more like"
x, based on its distance from ci. Cells not within this neighborhood are not
altered.
This algorithm is repeated for every element of the training set. In the general
case there is some learning rate a that effects the extent to which cells are made "more
like" inputs, and which might decrease over time. Because in this model SOMs are
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used more as a self-organizing data structure than a clustering algorithm, and there
is no set size of the inputs, this learning rate is omitted in my implementation of the
algorithm.
It is worth noting that when run repetitively on a finite training set, SOMs are
guaranteed to converge to a point where the cells fluctuate a distance less than C as the
number of cycles approaches infinity. Because in my work there is no predetermined
training set-the "input" is not finite-there is not an expected outcome to which
the maps converge.
2.4 Previous Work
In his 2003 Master's thesis, Stephen Larson showed that a self-organizing map can
be used for symbol grounding. The system can assign meaning to symbols just by
interacting in a Blocks world, without the impleinenter needing to step in. The fact
that a SOM could be used to model how people assign meaning has been the basis
and inspiration for other such work.
One attempt to use natural language and self-organizing maps as a memory system
has already been pioneered by Seth Tardiff in 2004. He used a SOM, in conjunction
with the BridgeSpeak parser developed by the Genesis group at MIT, to create a
memory map which could understand when events were surprising-an elephant flying
towards a tree, for example. My system does more than understand that something
is surprising; it filters information based on past experience, specific to the individual
providing the information.
15
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Chapter 3
Overview of the Model
The key feature of my proposed model of conversation is that every human has some
model of every person they've met. I have some image of my father, which is different
from his mother's view of him, neither of which is probably an accurate picture of
what he is. I form expectations based on my view of him, and how I internalize what
he says to me depends upon that view.
To model a human being, I use one SOM to represent likes and dislikes in the
world, and another for each other person that human has had interactions with.
This is the model of the inside of one person's head, not a model of the universe.
The SOMs depicted are a subjective view of each person, not an accurate reflection
of the world. The idea is that each of us carry inside of us opinions of everyone we
have ever interacted with. These opinions help us to determine how to behave should
we encounter the person again, and whether or not to believe what we're told.
In order to describe how the process is supposed to work, imagine that JOE and
ME are talking and JOE says "Cats can't fly." ME does three things: he checks to
see how much he trusts JOE in general, how much he trusts JOE about cats, and
what he already believes about cats and flying. There should also be some parameter
to represent how much weight ME gives to his own experience; some people are more
gullible than others, and more likely to disbelieve their own experience. These values
are then averaged, and the averaged truth value used to train ME's map of JOE, and
IE's own beliefs.
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The process is bootstrapping in a sense: JOE says things that ME believes, so ME
trusts JOE more, so the more JOE says, the more ME agrees with him. This is the
pattern of human behavior; it requires some amount of conversation to trust someone
at all, but then one is inclined to believe the other person until they say something
that seems implausible. Consider advertisements or political propaganda-they are
premised upon the idea that people's opinions can be changed simply by telling them
something frequently.
The nodes in the self-organizing maps have two components: a "content," provided
by BridgeSpeak, and a "truth value." The truth value is a number representing how
much the content is believed. This truth value is how trust is represented, and the
number used to calculate how much a new incoming statement is believed.
18
Chapter 4
Architecture and Implementation
4.1 Architecture
4.1.1 Model of a Person
A person begins life as a single self-organizing map. A person may be randomly
created, or he may be meticulously specified, but in principle he is a single SOM of
arbitrary size, with likes and dislikes. Every node in this SOM has a statement of the
form "I like X" or "I dislike X", and a percentage value that indicates how strong the
preference is. These percentages can be thought of as "belief' values, and this map
will be referred to as the SELF map: the map of personal beliefs.
As soon as two people meet for the first time, new maps are created. Each person
gets a map that represents how much they trust the other ("OTHER" maps). In
principle these maps start empty, though for practical purposes in this simulation
they are randomized. As more people meet, more maps are created. These maps
have the same format as the SELF maps: nodes contain statements of likes or dislikes,
and percentage values. Here the percentage values are interpreted differently: they
represent how much the map subject is trusted on the topic. So for example, if Zorba
has a map of Bob with a node that says "I like beets, 78%", the interpretation is
that Zorba believes that Bob likes beets, and trusts him a lot on the topic of beets.
Essentially, Zorba is willing to give Bobs opinion on beets a lot of weight when
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deciding what he himself feels about them. The percentage 78 also indicates how
strongly Zorba believes that Bob likes beets-how long it would take to convince him
that Bob's opinion is the opposite. The larger the number, the more firm Zorba is on
his view of Bob.
4.1.2 Model of a Conversation
Once we have people, the most important thing is for them to be able to talk to each
other. In this simulation, people are capable of only talking to one other person at
a time, but two different people can have a common acquaintance. In other words,
everyone lives in the same community, but the only way to interact is in pairs.
When people talk, they are able to talk only about their likes and dislikes. So
for example, Bob may continue his trend of expressing food tastes and say "I like
radishes" to Zorba. Zorba then incorporates this new information into his own world
view.
He does this by finding the best match for the topic "radishes" in both his SELF
map and his map of Bob. Call the result from SELF map S and the result from Bob's
map B. There are several relevant variables:
S.trust
B.trust
L = 1 if the statement indicated like, and -1 if dislike
For the purposes of this algorithm, if cell X contains a "dislike" statement, then
X.trust is negative.
There are two levels of blending: high and low. For "high" blending, which hap-
pens to the best matched node, the topics are blended by moving along the thread by
three steps, as described in the next section. The new trust value for S is determined
by:
2 * B.trust + L + 12 * B.trust + L) S.trust
21 21
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The intuition behind this formula is that how beliefs change should depend heavily
on the prior belief, and then upon the extent to which Bob is currently trusted on
this topic, as well as whether what he is saying contradicts what he has said before.
The first term corresponds to how trustworthy and consistent Bob is on the topic,
and the second term to what the current belief is.
The new trust value for B is:
L 3 * B.trust S.trust
5 5 5
Here the intuition is that the statement itself and the prior trust value are most
significant (and trust should be lower if they contradict), but there is a "disbelief'
element that makes it harder to believe things that contradict one's own world view.
Low levels of blending happen to the eight neighbors of S and B. "Low" blending
alters topics by moving two steps along the threads. New trust values are computed
using denominators of 30 and 7 instead of 21 and 5. These numbers were somewhat
arbitrarily chosen; they produce reasonable behavior, but so do most other choices.
While these constants affect the specifics of how fast the algorithm works, changing
the numbers should correspond to the variance between people, not to the difference
between what is human and what is not. Tweaking values changes the minute details
of behavior, not the underlying patterns.
Here are some examples of the effects of blending given different starting states.
These examples look only at the "winning" nodes in both the SELF and OTHER
maps, so they show a high level of blending. In all cases the scenario is that the other
person said "I like carrots" and the winning nodes in both the SELF and OTHER
maps have the topic potatoes.
1. SELF strongly likes potatoes, believes that OTHER likes potatoes, and strongly
trusts him about potatoes.
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like
potatoes
.9
like
potatoes
.9
"I like carrots"
"I like carrots"
like
potatoes
.913
like
potatoes
.92
2. SELF strongly likes potatoes, believes that OTHER doesn't like potatoes, and
strongly trusts him about potatoes.
like
potatoes
.9
dislike
potatoes
.9
"I like carrots"
"I like carrots"
like
potatoes
.828
dislike
potatoes
.16
3. SELF strongly dislikes potatoes, believes that OTHER likes potatoes, and
strongly trusts him about potatoes.
dislike
potatoes
.9
like
potatoes
.9
"I like carrots"
'I like carrots"
dislike
potatoes
.647
like
potatoes
.56
4. SELF strongly dislikes potatoes, believes that OTHER doesn't like potatoes,
and strongly trusts him about potatoes.
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SELF
OTHER
SELF
OTHER
SELF
OTHER
dislike
potatoes
.9
dislike
potatoes
.9
"I like carrots"
"I like carrots"
dislike
potatoes
.904
dislike
potatoes
.52
5. SELF strongly likes potatoes, has no notion of whether OTHER likes or dislikes
them, and does not trust OTHER at all about potatoes.
like
potatoes
.9
potatoes
0
"I like carrots"
"I like carrots"
like
potatoes
.905
like
potatoes
.38
6. SELF has no opinion on potatoes, believes that OTHER likes potatoes, and
strongly trusts him about potatoes.
potatoes
0
like
potatoes
.9
"I like carrots"
"I like carrots"
like
potatoes
.133
like
potatoes
.74
7. SELF has no opinion on potatoes, has no notion of whether OTHER likes or
dislikes them, and does not trust OTHER at all about potatoes.
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SELF
OTHER
SELF
OTHER
SELF
OTHER
"I like carrots" like
SELF potatoes , potatoes
0 .048
"I like carrots" like
OTHER potatoes , potatoes
0 .2
4.1.3 SOM Comparisons
In order to update the self-organizing maps, it needs to be possible to compare two
words. Retrieval is always on the topic of the sentence alone, so "I like zoos" is the
same as "I dislike zoos" for this purpose: the important part is to get a similar topic,
not a similar opinion.
These comparisons are done using threads obtained from WordNet via the Bridge
system. Each word in the dictionary actually has a number of different threads as-
sociated with it: "Bill Clinton" may be on a thread that contains "politician" and
"president" and also another that says "father." For the purposes of this demonstra-
tion I look only at the first thread that WordNet offers-usually the most common
sense.
To compare two words I take both of their threads and look for common words
lowest down. For example, to compare "dog" and "cat", their threads are:
<thread>entity object living-thing organism animal chordate
vertebrate mammal placental carnivore canine dog</thread>
<thread>entity object living-thing organism animal chordate
vertebrate mammal placental carnivore feline cat</thread>
Their lowest common meeting place is "carnivore." Next we count how much
remains on the tails of both of the threads to get our total distance, which in this
case is four-two on each thread. This distance metric is known as the distance from
the "fork point" and is a convenient and accurate way to compare two words which
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may not be at all alike. The closer they are in type, the lower down in the threads
the fork will be.
In addition to comparing two words, it is necessary to be able to make one word
more like another. Again, the threads aid this endeavor. One word is made more like
another by traversing its thread up to the fork point and then down the other thread.
As an example, if we wanted to make "cat" more like "dog", it would pass through
"feline," then "carnivore," then "canine," then "dog."
4.2 Implementation
The project is implemented using over thirty Java classes, compiled in Java 5.0. A
large part of the code base is devoted to the Swing user interface, which is extensive
and much of which was written by Amanda Smith and Amanda Seybold. The rest
of the code manages the SOMs and runs the conversation algorithms.
4.2.1 User Interface
It is both a strength and a weakness of Self-Organizing Maps that the only way to
really understand the changes in them without running complicated and potentially
misleading clustering algorithms, is to look at them with a human eye. This is simple
if the nodes are colors, but quite complicated when a node can have any noun in the
English language as its content, paired with a percentage value and a boolean for like
or dislike. Thus, an extensive user interface was created in order to manipulate the
model in a way meaningful to a human user.
The user interface displays "people" by showing their SOMs. There is a square
on screen representing each node in the Map, and the square's color is dependent
upon the trust value of the node and whether the content is liked or disliked. Blue
indicates like and red dislike, and the saturation of the color reflects the trust value.
Thus squares with very low trust values appear gray, indicating that the are close to
the border between like and dislike. Mousing over the square pops up a tooltip that
displays the content and the trust value, so that it requires very little effort to view
25
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Figure 4-1: View and search interface
the content of any cell. Additionally a map can be searched for a specific topic.
New people can be created via the interface, by entering the three relevant pieces
of information-topic, "like" or "dislike," and trust/belief percentage-for every cell.
People can also be randomly generated using this interface, or some blend of the two
methods.
People can be saved and loaded at any point in their "lives." Saving saves not
only their SELF map, but their maps of all other people, and everything that has
been said to them, in the order it was said and by whom. Loading restores all that
information. In addition, the save format is human readable, printing out every node
in a consistent order, so it doubles as a way to quickly convert current state to a form
that can be read later. Later you see examples of SOMs presented in this format.
The cornerstone of the model-the ability for two "people" to talk to each other-
is also interface-supported. The main screen allows two people to be loaded, and for
each displays both the SELF map, and the subjective map of the other person. There
are boxes to enter the content of the sentences spoken by each; after each sentence
the program displays the primary node that changed (at each iteration between six
and nine nodes change, but there is always one that is primary). A conversation can
26
Figure 4-2: Person creation interface
also be saved in a simple text format and then loaded into the interface, allowing
conversations to be generated via a script.
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model. Two people are loaded, one on each side, and the spoken conversation appears
in the window between them.
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Chapter 5
Results
Running tests on large maps sizes with hundreds of disparate topics is easy to do,
but hard to interpret. For that reason I will present the results of simple tests whose
behavior is easier to see. That these results can be generalized to larger cases should be
clear; we will consider a microcosm, but there is nothing different about the behavior
because of it.
In one test there are two people, one of whom is Talker, whose likes and dislikes
don't really matter, since his main purpose in life is to talk to our other person,
Antigone. Antigone loves animals and hates cars. Her initial opinions of Talker are
randomized, but are the same for every test. She looks like this:
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Fri
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
Apr
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
Figure 5-1: A list of each node in Antigone's SELF map listed. X and Y coordinates
of each node are the first two numbers listed on each line; the third number is the
belief level. This map was hand-coded to specifically talk only about animals and
cars.
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14 18:56:32 EDT 2006Antigone
0.9 dogs like
0.91 dogs like
0.9 dogs like
0.85 cats like
0.8 horses like
0.85 cats like
0.85 cats like
0.8 horses like
0.8 horses like
0.75 mice like
0.75 mice like
0.75 mice like
0.9 cars dislike
0.87 cars dislike
0.89 motors dislike
0.9 cars dislike
0.8 cars dislike
0.85 bikes dislike
0.92 bikes dislike
0.78 motors dislike
0.76 tires dislike
0.76 tires dislike
0.8 cars dislike
0.75 brakes dislike
0.8 brakes dislike
Fri Apr 14 18:57:17 EDT 2006Talker
0.0 0.0 0.8449560662913401 bodys dislike
0.0 1.0 0.12706835171195363 sauropods dislike
0.0 2.0 0.8686178225987744 copulations dislike
0.0 3.0 0.5343144217743439 clasts like
0.0 4.0 0.2369061102365756 tiers dislike
1.0 0.0 0.19590095582600875 tideways like
1.0 1.0 0.13142258099269466 geographers dislike
1.0 2.0 0.1493676194334339 shavians dislike
1.0 3.0 0.03532015726420412 maters like
1.0 4.0 0.4960353104872133 alternators like
2.0 0.0 0.8517391179068259 mimics like
2.0 1.0 0.15113948343466677 cricketers like
2.0 2.0 0.14315885670397677 planets like
2.0 3.0 0.06236750465080665 muslins dislike
2.0 4.0 0.6644249498010764 foundlings like
3.0 0.0 0.3571572137965756 effluents like
3.0 1.0 0.913969437546307 bearcats dislike
3.0 2.0 0.008997761190323916 teleprinters like
3.0 3.0 0.3857501120352197 marabous dislike
3.0 4.0 0.6491054628628916 elands like
4.0 0.0 0.5686919850642541 opossums dislike
4.0 1.0 0.09223112481051499 slops dislike
4.0 2.0 0.5109224375700278 beets like
4.0 3.0 0.9939876087360072 adoptees like
4.0 4.0 0.9428489881243048 trichloromethanes like
Figure 5-2: Antigone's map of Talker, as randomly generated initially.
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I, Anfigone,
Dislike
Figure 5-3: Graphical representation of Antigone's SELF map. Darker colors indicate
like, in this case of animals. Lighter colors indicate dislike, in this case of cars.
The first number in a row corresponds to an x-coordinate and the second number
to a y-coordinate. The third number is a "trust" value, the word following it is the
topic in that map cell, and the last word is either "like" or "dislike" and is the opinion
on that topic. The first set of rows is Antigone's SELF map, which I created by hand
to have only two categories of objects in it. The second is her map of Talker, as
randomly initialized. The random initialization takes words from WordNet, some of
which can be obscure.
Antigone's graphical form appears above. Recall that darker sections indicate
stronger like and lighter sections indicate stronger dislike. Thus the left side of the
map is the portion that represents liking animals, and the right is disliking cars.
There are three different hand-coded mini-conversations I used for testing: Ani-
mal, Car, and Mix. In Animal, Talker says that he likes various animals-cats, dogs,
and horses-in ten statements. In Car, Talker says that he likes various vehicle-
related things-cars, brakes, and motors-in ten statements. Mix alternates state-
ments about liking animals and liking cars for ten statements.
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5.1 Untrustworthy Source Agrees With World View
What happens when Talker starts talking about how much he likes cats, given that
the closest match to "cats" that Antigone knows about him is that he dislikes them,
and she believes that very strongly? So when he begins to talk about liking animals,
there is some contradiction: he is appealing to Antigone's world view, but at the same
time being an untrustworthy person while doing so.
In the following test, Talker continuously says "I like cats." Antigone's level of
belief that she likes cats varies as follows:
.85
.78
.78
.80
.82
.84
.86
.88
Her trust of Talker varies as follows. The word in quotations on each line indicates
the best match word in her map of Talker at the time; it begins at "bearcats" and
travels along the thread with each training iteration to arrive at "cat":
"bearcats" dislike .91
"civet" dislike .18
"viverrine" like .25
"carnivore" like .51
"cat" like .66
.76
.82
.87
So we see that Antigone's belief dips a little at first; someone untrustworthy saying
that they like cats makes her like them less. Then as she comes to trust Talker more
because he continues to be consistent and insistent on this point, her belief increases
again, eventually passing its initial point.
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Figure 5-4: Graph of map behavior when Talker agrees with Antigone's current belief
of animals, given that Talker starts as an untrusted source.
5.2 Priming the Listener
In this test Talker uses the Animal set to try to get Antigone to trust him by talking
about things that she believes. Talker tries increase his ability to change Antigone's
mind by "priming" her by saying things she agrees with. In this experiment Talker
speaks the Animal set varying numbers of times before saying that he likes cars, and
then we can see what the end result of Antigone's opinion of cars is.
If Talker begins talking about cars immediately, the closest match in Antigone's
map of Talker is "likes teleprinters" at 1%. So Antigone has virtually no trust in
Talker's opinion of them. If Talker initiates the conversation by saying "I like cars,"
then Antigone's opinion of cars will go from "dislike 87%" to "dislike 78%."
If Talker initiates conversation with the Animal set and then says "I like cars,"
her opinion goes from 87% to 69%. If he begins with two Animal sets, the change is
from 80% to 63%. The starting percentage is lower because the changes caused by
the Animal set have spilled over to cars. Beginning with three Animal sets has the
same result. So clearly there is some priming effect, but there is a limit to the extent
of it.
The limitations to the priming effect are largely due to the neighborhood of map
34
1 -
S0.8 -
0.6 -
0.4 -
CL_ 0.2 -
0-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
number of "I like cats"
statements
Antigone's
belief
-- Antigone's
trust of Talker
Figure 5-5: Graph of the change in Antigone's opinion of cars when Talker primes
with either 0, 1, 2, or 3 Animal sets, and then says that he likes cars.
cells that are changed in each sentence. Each time Talker speaks a square region of
nine cells is modified. That square of cells is then more likely to be a match to the
next sentence, which keeps the changes confined within a small region, not spreading
across the entire map.
5.3 Offending the Listener
In principle, the priming effect should have a converse, where deliberately disagreeing
with a person causes them to believe everything less. In this test Talker will talk
about his liking of cars before then saying that he likes cats (recalling that Antigone
hates cars and likes cats). The Car set contains ten statements about liking cars.
As described before, if Talker begins the conversation with "I like cats," Antigone's
opinion of cats goes from "like 85%" to "like 78%." If he talks for one or two Car sets
and then says "I like cats," Antigone's opinion of cats stays constant at 85%. If he
does three Car sets, and then says it, her opinion actually goes from "like 85%" to
"like 86%."
This seems contradictory, and the reason for it is that talking about cars causes
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Figure 5-6: Graph of the change in Antigone's opinion of cats when Talker offends
with either 0, 1, 2, or 3 Car sets, and then says that he likes cats.
some of the cells in Antigone's map of Talker to generalize. At the same time, it's
internally consistent, so after ten statements Antigone is beginning to be convinced
about cars, and gives more credence to Talker's opinions.
5.4 Self-Contradiction
If a person continually says contradictory things, this should reduce their trustwor-
thiness. In this test Talker alternates saying that he likes and dislikes cats, and we
take the average trust value in Antigone's map of Talker at the end.
After one set of ten statements of alternating like and dislike, the average trust
in Antigone's map of Talker drops from 43.5% to 34.2%. After that the average
fluctuates around 34% (the nodes actually changing vary between 15% and 20%).
This is because Antigone's own opinion of cats causes her to give more weight to the
statements of like than the ones of dislike, so the two don't cancel each other out. It
still follows the general pattern that we don't trust people who are inconsistent.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
The first thing to note is that there are very few parameters that need to be set. Even
the equations themselves are robust against excessive modifications. Part of the goal
of this thesis was to see what was possible with as few parameters as possible; hence,
some of the following discussion will include problems that could be fixed by adding
additional parameters.
6.1 Characteristics of Present Model
* Trust can be built up by catering to another person's world view. This is
equivalent to telling someone what they want to hear, but because they have
no prior knowledge of you, they believe it and think better of you for it.
" An untrustworthy source agreeing with you makes you believe something less.
This may seem a little counterintuitive, but consider the 2004 presidential elec-
tions, when the rumor that "Saddam Hussein supports Kerry" was circulating.
One tries to not be aligned with the untrustworthy source, and as a result
questions existing beliefs
" When a person continually contradicts himself the result is a lack of trust.
People with no internal consistency can't be trusted. The exact level to which
they can't be depends upon the constants in the algorithm's equations.
" Order matters when it comes to conversations: saying something and then say-
ing the opposite doesn't obliterate the first statement. Essentially, this means
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that you can't erase the past, or take back something once said.
" As long as the conversation topics are somewhat broad-ranging, the "topic"
fields of the SOMs become more general. One of the effects of this is that they
are more likely to match new topics. This means that the longer people talk, not
only do they begin to trust each other on the specific topics they are discussing,
but that trust spreads further. When introducing a new topic it is more likely
to be trusted because of this generalization.
" If you tell someone something enough, they begin to believe it. Each statement
of like or dislike introduces more like and dislike into the universe, so eventually
saying the same thing enough times will bring the other person in line with
what you are saying. I think this is the theory behind brainwashing, but it's
not clear how applicable it is to ordinary life.
" New topics obliterate the old. The map is a fixed size, and does not grow under
this model, so there is a finite number of specific topics that can exist in it.
So for example, if Antigone and Creon spend some time talking about tigers,
and then talk about fish for awhile, the specific knowledge about tigers may get
lost. This might be a reasonable memory model--that new information blots
out the old-but there's no reason to choose any particular size of map. This
essentially means that there is an additional and unintended parameter in the
model: map size.
" Practically speaking, belief and trust values can never actually get to 100%.
Because the equations involve a lot of averaging, it would take rounding error
to ever believe something or trust someone completely. It could be argued that
people never completely believe anything, but at the same time, I have a lot of
confidence in the fact that I can not fly.
* The area of effect of one single topic of conversation or one single sentence is
limited by the sphere of influence. Any individual sentence changes only nine
map cells, therefore the largest effect of any one statement is to alter nine topics.
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In principle, repeating the topic could cause the effect to alter another nine, for
a total of eighteen changes, but the most likely event is that if the topic is
repeated, the best match will be within the range of already altered cells. Thus
the likely area of effect is only nine to fourteen cells. As the topic continues with
minor variations more cells may get pulled in, but because of the likelihood that
a match comes from the altered region, it is likely that only about sixteen cells
will be altered from a single topic of conversation, no matter how many times it
is repeated. This limits the effect on overall trust that one topic of conversation
can have.
6.2 Speculation on Next Steps
" The equations are symmetric: trust is gained and lost at the same rate. There's
no bias towards trusting people or distrusting people, which seems unlikely to
correspond to reality. This could potentially be fixed by means of a "gullibility"
parameter, but could be troublesome if psychologically speaking the rate of
gaining trust has a different curve shape than the rate of losing it.
" If one wanted to represent the world-things that actually, physically happen-
one could make a new person called World, and make all people trust World
100%. It would be necessary to prevent anyone from changing their opinion
of World. It requires only a very small modification to add the ability for
concrete actions to happen. Furthermore, insanity could be modeled by allowing
someone's trust in World to change. Once World started contradicting what
they believed, their trust in it would diminish and they'd stop believing the
things they "see."
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Chapter 7
Contributions
" Identified a tractable problem within the vast realm of providing context to
memory.
" Designed a model of how humans learn to trust each other that is simple, with
very few parameters. The model is extensible and customizable; the "character-
istics" of a person are specified by a map and some constants in two equations.
People can discuss their likes and dislikes across a wide range of topics; any
topic with an annotated thread in WordNet will work.
" Implemented the model in Java, complete with graphical user interface.
" Tested the behavior of the model on several different types of conversations:
an untrustworthy person agreeing with one's world view, a person continuously
changing his mind, a person contradicting one's world view, and a person at-
tempting to build trust by agreeing with one's world view.
* Showed that the tests reveal model behavior similar to what one might expect
from a human. These simulated people can be swayed by propaganda, irritated
by inconsistency, and brainwashed.
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